

2. Comments on the recommendations.

No. 23. It is recommended that:

The Deputy Director for Intelligence formulate and coordinate a CIA position on requirements for overhead reconnaissance in such a way as to identify those disagreements which may require resolution by higher authority.

a. Deficiency it is supposed to remedy.

The report states that the Agency has failed to develop a coordinated position on requirements for the collection and exploitation of overhead photography. As a result it has not implemented its potential and responsibility to provide leadership and direction to the intelligence community in coping with problems related to the collection and exploitation of this new intelligence source. Because of these two deficiencies more is being collected than can be efficiently exploited and more is collected than the government needs for national security purposes.

b. Degree to which the recommended action is likely to remedy the deficiency.

The assumption on which the recommendation is based, that the Agency lacks a unified internal position on requirements for the collection and exploitation of overhead photography, no longer applies to the situation. It is true that no formal organization exists for the Agency-wide

coordination of internally generated collection requirements, most of which come from the DD/I, the DDS&T, and the DD/P. Although CGS provides support on a community wide basis to COMOR and USIB, CGS is technically a DD/I staff. In practice, however, Chairman COMOR, who is a member of the DDS&T, and the ADDI have been meeting weekly with interested Agency personnel to develop an Agency position on photo-reconnaissance problems expected to arise in COMOR and USIB. This ad hoc group is making significant progress in coping with both specific and general problems of what, when, and how much to collect.

The development of a policy on these subjects requires in turn the creation of a rationale. In the early days of overhead reconnaissance when the data base was very limited and the requirements both numerous and urgent, it seemed necessary to collect a great deal against many targets and to process the take at once. Currently, this early rationale is yielding to more relaxed concepts of means appropriate to the satisfaction of continuing priority needs, while extending the data base as a by product of priority collection. Logic is being developed to determine the kind and quantity of collection needed against the various types of missile systems, airfields, naval installations, ground order of battle, and other targets. Sampling

techniques are being explored to control the frequency of surveillance and a committee is working out a list of practical indications targets. From this approach a policy is evolving. As rapidly as it emerges it can be applied by the recently created informal committee. Whether the formalization of the ad hoc committee would expedite thinking about how to rationalize collection is doubtful. For the present it is probable that it is more important for a group to be meeting, and discussing the internal problems and achieving consensus, than to formalize and legalize the existence of such a group. If this action proves to be successful over time then the course recommended by the IG report, namely the referral of disagreements to higher authority for resolution, may prove to be unnecessary.

Management in both the DD/I and DIA is concerned about the cost implications of expanding collection and exploitation. It is remarkable that following the imposition of tighter controls on PI overtime in NPIC the backlog of work has declined. Although lax validation of requirements by DIA is still a problem, DIA management at the USIB level has proved amenable and responsible to the concept of operating within fixed budget constraints for collection.

The recommendation is thus outdated and unnecessary. The Agency is developing a position as rapidly as the maturing

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state of the art permits. The ad hoc group to develop policy is functioning successfully and is minimizing the need to appeal to higher authority.

c. Restatement of recommended action in operable terms.

It is recommended that: Agency components continue to meet under the sponsorship of the Chairman COMOR and the ADDI to formulate and coordinate a CIA position on requirements for overhead reconnaissance, in order to minimize the need for appealing to higher authority to settle disagreements.

Discussion at this level will not only achieve coordination of Directorate requirements within the Agency, but will be tempered by responsibility for operating within budgetary constraints for both collection and exploitation. To facilitate informed discussion at this level it is also recommended that the Chairman and Agency member of the Interagency Photoworking Group (IPWG) meet periodically with Agency components to discuss problems facing the working group and to develop an Agency position on these problems.

d. Insurance that the action element is proper.

The Chairman of COMOR and the IPWG) respectively have requirements that a clear and cogent Agency position be developed to facilitate the operation of their groups. This responsibility is shared in each instance with the Agency member of the interagency group. As the senior member it is

appropriate that the Chairman preside over the internal meeting. As Chairman of the Interagency committee, however, he will be responsible for developing a community position, which may transcend that of the Agency. In urging that Agency chairmen of interagency committees follow the example of the DCI in USIB it must be remembered that this role carries with it the responsibility of rising above the views of any particular agency, including our own.

e. Determination of whether adoption of the recommended action will induce other undesirable effects.

As noted in d. above, it is important that the CIA member in each case present to the interagency group the rationale developed, and attempt to persuade the group to replace ad hoc agency requests with a rational program when applicable. It is important to remember, nevertheless that the state of the art is in flux and that what now appears to be logical not be permitted to coalesce prematurely into inflexible doctrine. At this stage of the development of technical collection, it is important to maintain a high measure of flexibility in adapting to new problems.

f. Acceptance or rejection of restated recommended action on merits.

Acceptance of the restated recommended action is recommended.

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3. Consideration of the principal deficiencies affecting the DD/I.

a. Recommendations to remedy the deficiency.

In contrast to other means of collection which are deficient in providing a limited response to requirements, the report criticizes aerial reconnaissance because like Midas it is susceptible to responding too much. The report fears that excessive collection will produce more intelligence than required for national security, will squander resources, and will result in a dilution of the quality of exploitation. The report also seems to imply that it is wasteful to collect more than can be exploited at once, although a good argument can be made for maximizing the by product take of priority missions, for exploitation at a later date. Mapping and charting would appear to constitute such by products.

Various recommendations in the report apply indirectly to the problem of greater selectivity and restraint in the placing of requirements for overhead reconnaissance, but most of these recommendations are too indirect to make much of an impact on the problem. These include:

1. Revision of DCID 1/3 to include only national survival items.

4. Relationship of requirements to the IPC list.

24-25. Measures to insure managerial review of requirements.

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26. Assistance to CGS in controlling the information explosion.

Major concern is demonstrated, however, in Recommendation 23, the only one which treats directly the subject of overhead reconnaissance.

b. Degree to which the recommended action is likely to remedy the deficiency.

There is no necessary connection between restraint in controlling the contribution of overhead reconnaissance to the spread of the information explosion and the recommendation for the development of a coordinated Agency position on requirements for collection and exploitation of overhead photography. A coordinated position which accedes easily to Agency requests, might add to the sum total of requirements instead of contributing to their attenuation. What is needed is an Agency contribution to a responsible program which develops a rationale for the minimum collection necessary to satisfy priority requirements for national security. Within this framework, provision can then be made for by product collection of secondary national requirements and priority departmental requirements. Similar scaling of assets for exploitation is needed. Experience indicates, however, that restraint cannot be generated at the working level but must be imposed by responsible management, which is capable of viewing alternative courses of action in perspective and making choices of cutoff points for intensity of collection and exploitation. It will thus be the

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responsibility of the ad hoc committee discussed in 2. above not merely to develop a coordinated Agency policy for collection and exploitation but to insure that such a policy is cost responsive.

c. Additional recommendations.

None.

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18 January 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence  
Deputy Director for Plans  
Acting Deputy Director for Science and Technology  
Deputy Director for Support  
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence  
Programs Evaluation  
Director of National Estimates  
Special Assistant to the DCI [REDACTED]  
Director, Office of Planning, Programming  
and Budgeting

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SUBJECT: Inspector General's Report on Foreign  
Intelligence Collection Requirements

1. Copies of the subject report have now been distributed to you.
2. It will take a good deal of staff work by your subordinates to help us decide on the precise extent to which we should adopt, modify, or reject the recommendations of this report. Some of them are not in any case susceptible of early decisive action without preparation at the grass roots and agreement between directorates. I have read the report and request that you personally read it before passing it on to your staff for detailed study and comment.
3. Each addressee is requested to make such comments as he feels appropriate. In addition, specific comments are requested from the recipients on those recommendations addressed to them. These should reach me within 30 calendar days from the date of this memorandum.
4. Under no circumstances will the report be circulated or discussed outside the Agency at this time.

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[REDACTED]  
Randy Taylor  
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy  
Deputy Director